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Summary: Universal Basic Income
Summary
Concern over massive structural unemployment, due to technological automation and globalization, is on the
rise. Universal Basic Income (UBI) has attracted attention from both sides of the aisle as one potential
solution to a scenario where a large number of people are not able to earn a livable wage. In order to
understand the economic implications of UBI, economists have studied previous and current examples of
UBI-type programs, analyzing their impact on consumption, labor force participation, education, health, and
other key metrics.
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Concern over massive structural unemployment, due to technological automation and globalization, 
is on the rise. Universal Basic Income (UBI) has attracted attention from both sides of the aisle as one 
potential solution to a scenario where a large number of people are not able to earn a livable wage. In 
order to understand the economic implications of UBI, economists have studied previous and current 
examples of UBI-type programs, analyzing their impact on consumption, labor force participation, 
education, health, and other key metrics.
UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME: BACKGROUND
At its core, UBI is a regular transfer of cash to all residents within 
a specific geographic region, for the long-term, without any 
conditions. UBI differs from current welfare programs in the U.S. 
because it does not set an income threshold, nor does it stipulate 
how the money must be spent. In his 1962 book Capitalism and 
Freedom, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman argued 
in favor of UBI to replace welfare programs which, he argued, 
disincentivized work and created welfare dependency.  President 
Nixon was receptive to Friedman’s ideas about welfare reform 
and, in 1971, proposed a negative income tax (NIT) transfer, a type 
of UBI, as the centerpiece of his welfare reform program. Nixon’s 
reform bill was not passed by Congress and political support for UBI 
waned.  As proposals for UBI have regained traction, a lot can be 
learned from earlier policy experiments during and since the Nixon 
administration.
NEGATIVE INCOME TAX (NIT) EXPERIMENTS
From 1968 to 1982, the U.S. and Canadian governments conducted 
five NIT experiments. Each experiment had a different guaranteed 
income, several with transfers of large sums of money equal to the 
poverty line, as well as different withdrawal rates. The effects of 
NIT on work showed that with a 10% increase in unearned income, 
the number of hours worked dropped 1%, or about 2-4 weeks over 
a year. The effect was not always statistically significant, however, 
and there were selective attrition and misreporting problems with 
the study’s design.  
Still, NIT was found to have positive effects on health and on 
educational metrics such as school attendance, grades, and test 
scores, especially amongst the most economically disadvantaged. 
But the implied negative impact on the overall labor force was 
enough leverage for opponents of UBI to diminish political interest, 
effectively halting the progress of UBI legislation in Congress.
EASTERN BAND OF CHEROKEE INDIANS CASINO 
DIVIDEND
In 1997, the Eastern Band of Cherokees in North Carolina opened 
a casino on tribal land. Since then, the revenue from the casino 
has been given back to every tribal member, without condition, as 
a form of UBI. The amount of money each member receives per 
year averages between $4,000 and $6,000. By comparing tribal 
members with non-tribal members in the same area before and 
after 1997, economists have been able to assess the effect of the 
cash transfer. The data show members who receive the casino 
dividend work the same number of hours as those who do not, have 
improved education (as much as one extra year for the poorest 
Cherokee households), commit less crime, and have improved 
mental health and decreased addiction. 
“We know that giving people cash 
with no strings attached has small 
effects on work.”
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ALASKA PERMANENT FUND
The Alaska Permanent Fund was created in 1976 with the 
stipulation that at least 25% of all revenue from the oil industry 
be invested and the dividends on the investment be paid out to all 
Alaskans, with no strings attached.  Since June 1982, every Alaskan 
has received anywhere from $331 to $2,072 per year, depending on 
the performance of the investment. 
The Alaska Permanent Fund provides a particularly good 
opportunity to study the behavioral economic impacts of UBI. The 
program applies to all Alaskans, whereas the other studies were 
not universal, and the Alaska Permanent Fund provides 30 years 
worth of data, making it possible to study the long-term effects. 
By using the synthetic control method and comparing Alaska with 
a composit of similar states, Professor Marienescu and co-author 
Damon Jones studied the causal impact of the Alaska Permanent 
Fund.   
 
Evidence from the study suggests that the cash transfer Alaskans 
receive stimulates the local economy, with greater spending 
towards local businesses. The income effect, which typically leads 
people to work less as they receive more income, is counteracted 
by the increase in labor demand from industries serving the local 
consumers. The overall employment effect is null or slightly 
positive.
Figure 1: Employment Synthetic Control (the effect on full-time 
employment was not statistically significant)
Figure 2: Part-Time Workers Synthetic Control (the effect on part-time 
employment was positive)
LOTTERY WINNERS
Winning the lottery is similar to receiving a UBI. The money is often 
given to the winner in installments, with no conditions, over a long 
duration. Furthermore, the sample is random, creating an ideal 
economic case study. Two such studies in the U.S. and Sweden 
show consistent results: the effect of winning the lottery is similar 
to the effect of NIT. A 10% increase in unearned income leads to a 
1% decrease in earned income. Very few people stopped working. 
Winning $140,000 decreases the probability of working by about 2 
percentage points, with the effect being zero after 10 years. Lottery 
winners instead worked fewer hours but remained employed, took 
more vacations, and consumed more.
 
FINANCING UNIVERSAL BASIC INCOME
Is UBI financially feasible, though? There are two financing options 
for UBI: (1) spending cuts to other programs, and (2) raising 
additional revenue. Financing will depend on the amount of the 
basic income. In 2017 the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development ran a simulation of basic income for all those 
under 65 years of age, financed by cutting most existing types 
of cash benefits and tax-free allowances. The result showed that 
at current spending levels in the U.S., the non-elderly benefit per 
capita would fall well below the poverty line. Clearly, spending cuts 
would not be sufficient to fund UBI. However, if combined with 
additional revenue, UBI becomes more feasible in the U.S. 
A carbon fee would be one possible source of new revenue.  A 
recent poll showed 67% of adults in the U.S. approved of the idea 
as long as it was revenue-neutral (revenue raised by the fee would 
not be spent by the government). The money generated by the 
carbon fee could finance a small UBI. This plan would incentivize a 
reduction in carbon pollution, help reduce negative effects on the 
climate, and create revenue to give a cash transfer of approximately 
$583 per person per year, no strings attached. 
CONCLUSION
Based on evidence from existing studies, economists have shown 
giving people cash with no strings attached has only a small 
negative effect on work, and can improve educational and health 
outcomes, especially among the most disadvantaged. Paying 
for such a program, however, is not a trivial matter. As political 
appetite for UBI is growing, a new UBI program is more likely to be 
implemented at the state level than at the federal level.
Figure 3: The Distribution of $49/mt Carbon Tax and Revenue Recycling 
Options
